Human Security

Introduction

In the early 1990s human security (HS) appeared to be part of a major reform of the underlying philosophy, interests, material capacities and institutions of International Relations, particularly in a move towards consolidating a liberal peace.[ii] It has drawn together an international range of actors and analysts in a common research project spanning a range on cultures and political ideologies.[iii] Yet by the 2000s, and from where we stand today, any associated international community of actors which had adopted this new version of security now seem to have turned it into an empty concept, not redolent of a social contract, and international contract, responsibility towards others, intellectual and policy openness, concerned with the very being and situation of individuals and communities caught up in violence. This apparent collapse of HS is far more important that the initial conservative complaints that it was simply too broad to be operationalised in the 1990s. The contestation of HS remains an ongoing debate.

By the 2000s, it became clear that HS had partially collapsed because, like many concepts and theories associated with conflict management, resolution, peacebuilding, development, political stabilisation and reconciliation (and indeed orthodox IR itself), it has been captured by the conservative wing of liberalism (which itself has been partially co-opted by political realism).[iv] This saw it deployed as a cover for social engineering, institutionalisation, and statebuilding as well as military/ humanitarian intervention since the mid-1990s, in order to provide a veneer of legitimacy for interventionary projects (which are often more focused on regional order and state institutions than they are on HS as it was critically envisaged).

Predictably, the liberal peace and statebuilding project itself has now more or less collapsed in terms of its aspirations to universal legitimacy, or in terms of local perceptions of its legitimacy.[v] Yet, some scholars see the critiques, radical,

post- colonial or otherwise, of liberal peace as being answerable by the remounting of the HS concept, both in theoretical and policy terms.[vi] This appeal to the emancipatory aspect of HS present in its earlier conceptualisations in my view, rather than its conservative co-option that focused on its provision by international institutions, distant and technologically 'advanced', and ultimately depoliticising and capacity- destroying, offers some hope for the concept's revitalisation in an international system (or western-oriented international community) that still remains concerned with helping or 'saving' others.

But, some significant obstacles remain if this emancipatory version of HS is to be, or remains, framed by the liberal peace, by liberal statebuilding, and by the western international communities' capacities (or lack thereof), interests, norms, policies, and theories. If this community is to determine and provide for its others in conflict settings, emancipatory HS should not operate as if its subjects are helpless and incapacitated would-be liberals, but instead should help determine an approach to security on post-liberal terms and which enables local autonomous agencies (self- government and self-determination) in negotiation with international norms. A post- colonial version of HS should emerge, in other words, capable of organising hybrid understandings of security in relation to the human subjects they produce rather than falling back on the often empty securitisation of western forms of liberalism and realism.

For HS to overcome such problems and reach its potential, an emancipatory version of HS, as I argued for in a previous paper,[vii] needs to engage with 'local-local' understandings of security, and to recognise difference, enable agency and to respect autonomy as far as possible. This may form the basis for a post-colonial renegotiation of liberalism and of local context in their 'local-local', transversal, transnational forms. Post-liberal versions[viii] of HS, conservative, institutional, or emancipatory, would seek to enable local autonomous agency, whether liberal or non-liberal, individual, community, or institutional, while also respecting international norms, rights, and institutional frameworks. This would see HS as a basis for the emergence of hybrid agencies for peacebuilding, both local and international, and point towards self and mutual emancipations, which

are representative of fairly autonomous localised agencies as well as -and not just- international agencies. This will, as in the current debate over 'reaching out' the Taliban in Afghanistan,[ix] or the incorporation of customary forms of governance into the 'modern' states in Timor Leste or the Solomon Islands,[x] often be very uncomfortable, but ultimately both locally and internationally resonant (rather than mainly resonant from a western perspective). This would be as opposed to the view that HS might be used as a way of converting 'others' to political liberalism and its attendant institutions. Here may also lay the roots of an international-social contract for peacebuilding, which scholars have called for in several forms. This essay examines the dynamics of the initial two main forms of HS which emerged in the 1990s, and the current possibilities of a return of HS in a third, post-liberal and hybrid form.

HS and Liberal Peace building

When the concept of HS was first articulated as an alternative to territorial and military security through a focus on individual security and sustainable development, it drew upon a range of antecedents that had long been critical of mainstream orthodoxies.[xi] There was a clear concern that it might it undermine sovereignty, however.[xii] Yet, HS became a central concept in the development of a liberal international system after the end of the Cold War, and is visible in documentation such as the Responsibility to Protect and the subsequent High Level Panel Report.[xiii] Yet, predictably perhaps during the 'war on terror' many states and actors began to abandon the concept, arguing that it was too ambitions and had become somewhat 'hollow', and that what was needed in general terms was not a focus on HS but on statebuilding. Still, human security remains a recognised concept across much of the UN system and in many member states and donors.[xiv]

In its broadest incarnation, HS was defined as „freedom from want" and „freedom from fear": positive and negative freedoms and rights. HS became a validating concept of the overall liberal peace project"s goals, even though many

international actors working in non-civil society oriented areas may not use this term to describe their work. Because HS is constructed within the context of democratisation, the rule of law, human rights, free trade, globalised markets, and neoliberal economic development it is most strongly characterised by an institutional approach, but of course this is legitimated by its emancipatory claims. The actors generally associated with HS are foreign state donors, state donor funded non- governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), international agencies, international financial institutions (IFIs), and regional organizations, all of which have tended to present HS as a universal set of very basic security needs constructed within a liberal state. This is then extended to reflect the right of such "internationals" to bypass state sovereignty and officialdom, and to intervene in areas that are normally reserved for domestic, sub-regional, community, or familial competency. The definitions, associated rights, needs, and limits of HS are constructed according to an external liberal consensus with the automatic assumption that what translates into a merging of military security and humanitarian provisions conforms to local expectations and needs, while serving as a universally liberal normative regime. Such processes are conducted by donor states and IOs, such as the UN and its agencies, the World Trade Organization and the World Bank, in association with with civil society.[xv] While it is odd that HS can be framed in this way, without any real engagement with 'local' issues, needs, sources of identity, or authority, HS has also provided a basis by which these have increasingly become a factor in top-down versions of liberal peacebuilding.

The discourses and practices associated with HS-oriented approaches involve a normative commitment to the just settlement of conflict, the reframing of security debates, and the involvement of either external non-state actors with access to conflict zones, or domestic non-state actors. This is connected to the role and status that civil society now has in the construction of peace, producing a range of complex tensions in the operationalisation of the concept. Civil society focused intervention has been important in the wider legitimization of the liberal peace.[xvi] This is aimed at constructing a future social contract as a way of balancing elite governance with the emancipation of citizens in a civil society.

Thus, HS is strongly connected to the liberal peace, which has four main strands including the victor"s peace, the institutional peace, the constitutional peace, and the civil peace. These strands of liberal peacebuilding, leading to a conservative or institutionally focussed process or outcome, are often legitimised by appeals for a future emancipatory graduation of the liberal peace. This incorporates in particular the following: an institutional strand, resting upon the attempts to anchor states within a normative and legal context in which states multilaterally agree how to behave and how to enforce or determine their respective behaviour; an constitutional strand, resting upon the Kantian argument that peace rests upon democracy, trade, and a set of cosmopolitan values that begin from the notion that individuals are ends in themselves, rather than means to an end; and a civil strand, derived from the phenomena of direct action, of citizen advocacy and mobilization, in the attainment or defence of basic human rights and values.[xvii] Without a civil peace and HS, an institutional and constitutional peace is unlikely to be legitimate, and the resulting conservative focus merely resembles a colonial praxis of intervention. Without legitimacy and consensus- via a social contract and a civil society- the liberal peace veers towards the unsustainable conservative end of the spectrum where peace is top-down, based upon coercion or force, and focuses on constraints rather than emancipation.

In this context, HS is assumed to enable the implementation of an emancipatory civil peace and a social contract, contributing to the construction of a constitutional peace in a broader international context. This reflects both institutional and emancipatory strands of HS. At the same time states, international institutions, and IOs are provided with legitimate access to the norms, regimes, and institutions of civil society and the HS discourses they deploy. Partly because of this, the liberal peace has become an end that appears to legitimize the means, giving rise to some significant contradictions in contemporary non-state practices designed to construct a liberal peace from the bottom up.

HS"s initial acceptance in policy circles was mainly because liberal-state and international-organization objectives shifted from status-quo management to the

multidimensional approaches toward peacebuilding in which strategies are applied that aim to transform conflict "into peaceful non-violent process of social and political change."[xviii] Yet, at the same time, and subversively, the version of HS that was being expounded was a liberal one focusing on legitimating the governance of post-conflict zones by external actors which would make their interactions conditional upon the liberal peace. These developments can be observed in the context of the UN "Agenda reports" for the reform of international approaches to peace, published throughout the 1990s, in which it is clear that the envisioned notion of peace depended significantly on agencies and on non-governmental actors and agencies due to their unparalleled access to conflict zones.[xix] Yet it still rested upon a conception of governance by liberal actors and their institutions rather than empowerment and emancipation, though of course these were deemed to be a product of HS oriented strategies.

HS developed to allow such a move.[xx] Broadening security to include a range of political, social, and economic factors allowed for the consideration of security in the context of everyday life, though this soon attacked and labelled as implausible and unable to be operationalised.[xxi] As it was widely adopted in by various states and international organisations it developed into a liberal institutionalist form, rather than the emancipatory form that was often envisaged.[xxii] While it is likely that actors engaged in HS practices often replicate state practices (particularly through their conditional relationship with their state donors), this tends to overlook the independent capacity of some HS actors that has also emerged, which enables them to act independently of institutional and state control. Yet, there is a broad concurrence between HS-oriented agents and their actions, and that of states and their organisations within the liberal peace context. While this concept and these types of actors seem to provide a challenge to the traditional foundations of the international system, most non-state actors must work within the confines of the dominant institutions and regimes of the state to preserve their very existence. In a sense, this reduces their role in the negotiation and re-negotiation of the peacebuilding

consensus (representing the common agreement between liberal states, donors, IOs, IFIs and NGOs, that the liberal peace is the objective of all HS-oriented interventions) as subservient to that of states. However, most commentators agree that non-state actors are a vital and key part of peacebuilding, and indeed that global governance is not possible without their cooperation.[xxiii] They have become integral to the overall project of the liberal peace because the many different actors involved in, and many approaches to, peacebuilding have been used to provide avenues of legitimate intervention for the broader state-led liberal peace project. These ever-deeper forms of intervention involve structural policies whereby social, political, economic, and cultural frameworks are altered or introduced to contribute to the creation of the liberal peace.

The implication of this is that both interveners and domestic actors effectively need to agree on what constitutes the peace to be installed, and how this is to be carried out. HS effectively provides a response to these concerns: the peace to be created protects the individual, and a mixture of international, local, official, and unofficial actors can take part in its provision. The Brahimi and the more recent High Level Panel reports developed familiar contradictions in this respect by declaring clear aspirations towards human security, but accepting their delegation to state provisions for peacebuilding through NGOs and other actors.[xxiv] What was characteristic of these developments was the emergence of democratisation as a key objective in which civil society could be stabilized in a sustainable manner and HS could be guaranteed.[xxv] What this indicated was that any form of intervention in a conflict, whether state, IO, or NGO, became implicitly contingent upon the actor‟s contribution to democratisation processes. Similarly, this was also associated with arguments about the need for development, which is itself linked to the entry of the conflict zone into the globalised economy. As can be seen from El Salvador to Angola, Mozambique and Cambodia, democratisation provides an umbrella for liberal constructions that are seen as integral to the creation of long-term sustainable conditions of peace. From Bosnia, to Kosovo and East Timor, international institutions and transitional administrations tried to take control of democratisation and

neoliberal development process. Aid and its provision, often through NGOs and UN and government agencies, now became linked to governance.[xxvi] The agendas established for creating human security meant that civil society became intricately entwined with official actors and transitional administrations through conditionalities relating to the construction of the liberal peace by donors vis-à-vis NGOs and their target populations. If HS had been about substituting absent agency it now began to look like it was being used to marginalise those local agencies.

The HS framework is susceptible to the accusation that it operates as liberal and neoliberal forms of biopower, through which intervention is designed to impact upon the most intimate aspects of human life. This is aimed at domesticating and normalising mainly non-western societies and communities caught up in humanitarian crises, bringing their political structures and socioeconomic interactions into a liberal peace and governance framework. It is in this bottom-up guise that liberal peacebuilding and its statebuilding wing appear from a local perspective to take on neocolonial perspectives via the importation of 'expert'-albeit not locally grounded in historical, cultural, linguistic, or political terms-knowledge into conflict zones, both for the many tasks associated with humanitarianism and security, and to establish "governmentality" in which control is taken over most political, social, economic, and identity functions of groups involved in conflict and in the construction of peace at the level of civil society. This governmentality actually depends upon the maintenance of a space between the local and the state/ international, in order to maintain authority, even though this may undermine local consent. Both the community and the individual are governed in a manner in which external actors will create peace.[xxvii] These practices and discourses have rapidly become a normalized part of our understanding of the liberal peace.[xxviii] Essentially, from this bottom-up analysis, the liberal peace can be said to be a hegemonic peace, broadly consensual from the perspective of the coalition of external actors involved in it. But, its consensuality also depends on the incentives provided by, or conditionality of, such forms of intervention. What this indicates is that the

privatization of peace and the increasing subcontracting of peace activities to private actors also masks a tendency for bottom- up peacebuilding to represent international rather than local consensus, and to overwhelm the voices of local actors involved in civil society efforts regarding the liberal peace.

The question of intervention on the part of non-state actors, and whether they intervene on a rights or needs basis, is an important step toward identifying the type of peace they are attempting to construct. Intervention on a rights basis generally follows liberal state norms, whereas intervention on a needs basis often bypasses state sovereignty. In either case, NGOs form intimate, conditional relationships involving sponsors and recipients. This points to a civil notion of peace that incorporates a broader program of social, political, economic, humanitarian, and developmental engineering according to the liberal peace which is propagated by major donor states, agencies, and IFIs. This indicates that the liberal peace is actually contested, to a large degree, by NGOs, state actors and organizations that gain access to civil society through NGOs, and local recipients.

Beyond this artificial civil society, contestations also occur in the 'local-local', in social, religion, customary, and labour movements. This is in emancipatory liberal terms, rather than in the institutional terms described above, concerned with the construction of the civil peace and concurrent deep intervention or social engineering. But beyond these liberal terms, from the perspective of the local and its many voices, opportunities arise for its contestation and the translation of the civil peace into a more contextual version. Herein lies the possibility of a new approach to HS, which evades its tendency to be drawn towards biopolitical forms of governmentalism, and offers a post-colonial response[xxix] in post-liberal terms to the perspective from contextual locations that liberal peacebuilding and HS have unfortunately become the praxis of a new colonialism.

Towards a Third Version of HS

In liberal terms, to recap then, there are two key versions of HS- the institutional approach and the emancipatory approach. The institutional approach is often fairly conservative in its aims in that it focuses on the provision of very basic versions of security, often through institutional building (via programmes such as Security Sector Reform or Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration) which often extend into building the basic institutions of state (such as in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, or Timor Leste, where such programmes have been integral to statebuilding). While one sees the creation of basic liberal institutions to provide HS as paramount, the emancipatory approach aims at the empowerment of individuals and the removal of unnecessary constraints over their lives. Within a liberal normative system it has ambitions to enable autonomous agency, though it assumes mistakenly that such agency will necessarily concur with the liberal peace framework. Both versions have failed to recognise the complexity of the environments in which they are deployed.

Despite the tendency to be pulled back to narrow and conservative versions, HS was designed and constructed with the notion of "others" in mind, and its provision is dependent upon an external act of definition as well as the capacity of local actors. This is perhaps one of the reasons why the concept, even in its narrower forms, has been so resonant in the UN General Assembly, amongst donors and development agencies such as UNDP. The institutionalist approach is derived from the intersection between realist and liberal thinking in IR and in policy more recently, and in particular is associated with a peacebuilding consensus on the liberal peace (though this may now be more accurately called a „neoliberal peace"). This certainly aspires rhetorically to HS in its broader forms, but in fact focuses narrowly and in problem-solving terms on basic security plus the construction of effective institutions of governance though which HS can be imported in to post conflict development settings. This top-down perspective takes HS to be dependent upon security and strong states and international intervention driven by hegemonic states, which establish the necessary institutions in order to provide for very basic forms of HS- mainly physical security. State building might be seen to be its platform.

Clearly, the ideological position that liberal peace building indicates for HS and the nature of the role of many non-state actors and NGOs in conflict zones in reproducing these types of dependencies mean that they are complicit in the reproduction of the liberal peace as the dominant form of conflict settlement. But this has led to a virtual peace, empty states, and a lack of reconciliation in most contexts. Because of the relationship of conditionality, this means that the civil peace generally reflects the dominant concerns of states and donors (governance, capacity building, and ownership are often mentioned in this context) and therefore is actually very close to the constitutional and institutional discourses of peace. Some actors happily accept this concurrence as inevitable in the context of the peace building consensus, while others, perhaps more focused on issues of social justice, may resist it. Yet, comfortable, perhaps verging upon the hegemonic, assumptions about HS and the liberal peace may obscure some of their important problems, particularly as they have been experienced by local actors in places like Kosovo or East Timor.[xxx] In the context of capacity building via the peace-building consensus, the problem has been not that a limited capacity is being built but that institutional and local capacity is being destroyed in target conflict environments. In this, it may well be that HS approaches and broader approaches to liberal peace building need a more careful appraisal: clearly making the human being a referent for security laudable, but the liberal peace framework is far more heavily weighted towards statebuilding than toward civil society.[xxxi]

Producing an emancipatory version of liberal HS, which empowers a local renegotiation of the liberal peace through the statebuilding process, which does not distort the structure of the state in favour of vested interests, and which reflects the needs of everyday life in post-conflict, development settings, is the next stage in this project. Welfare, local ownership, feedback for internationally driven projects from local actors and the 'local-local', and the realisation of the inalienable connection of work, welfare, culture, and the local with democratic and stable states, are crucial if a self-sustaining, emancipatory peace, not merely an externally sustaining conservative peace, is to be constructed.[xxxii]

The emancipatory approach derives from the Critical impulse in political theory and IR, and underlying conflict resolution and peacebuilding. It offers a focus on emancipation as the aim of HS. This bottom-up approach means that individuals are empowered to negotiate and develop a form of HS that is fitted to their needs- political, economic, and social, but also provides them with the necessary tools to do so. This is by necessity focussed on a broad notion of HS, on external providers of HS, but aims at local agency as its ultimate expression. HS is therefore focused upon emancipation from oppression, domination, hegemony, as well as want. It is thought of as a universal project, but one that is capable of being shaped and reflecting local interests and particularities. The trouble with this version of HS has been that it has been unable to transcend its liberal and neoliberal strait-jacket.

These variants of HS underpin the modern liberal state in its orthodox politically liberal and economically neoliberal form in that they provide a security space in which civil society and a social contract may emerge. In modern statebuilding terms, however, this civil society and social contract have been elusive, and from Afghanistan to Timor Leste, such states have tended to be 'weak' and survive because of an elite and international bargain. All too often this has been at the expense of the social contract and civil society.[xxxiii] This has meant that HS has not been achieved in its emancipatory form because this would indicate the achievement of the relatively autonomous agency of citizens in their state context, incorporating democracy, human rights, a rule of law, and development. Given the scale of political, social, and economic problems in may post-conflict settings, a conservative version of HS has mainly been achieved, which has enabled a limited form of security rather than undoing structural violence and providing for social justice.

It has become clear that that liberal peacebuilding cannot succeed either in building a viable state, a civil society, or a social contract, or indeed reconciliation, unless it carries a large proportion of its target population with it via a broad consensus. Creating institutions without legitimacy or local participation has not so far succeeded anywhere since the end of the Cold War.

Basic security might have been achieved in some post-conflict zones, but this has not been seen as enough on the ground by its recipients, who were often engaged in conflicts which expressed their claim for social justice, self-determination, or a fairer distribution of resources from their own perspectives. Any international intervention which actively supports or implies a direction which did not acknowledge these realities has been seen as neo- colonial and ill-suited to, or even disdainful of, local contextual forms of agency, politics, society, cultures, identity, and economics. So a conservative version of HS has been locally unattractive, and effectively appeals for a more emancipatory version of HS has become a rallying cry in many locales, albeit translated as such by local actors, whether civil society actors, social movements, chiefs, religious or other customary institutions, into such language so internationals can understand them. This has also held international interventions to account in local terms for the failures of the liberal peacebuilding project so far. But while the emancipatory version of HS might be attractive in this translated context, and in juxtaposition to the failure of liberal peacebuilding or institutional versions of HS, it is also something of an illusion.

To resonate more with everyday life in a range of different contexts, HS needs to be contextually mediated in every application. It is in this latter process of the local renegotiation of liberal peacebuilding, now underway in many post-conflict zones where a third, and perhaps most significant, evolution of HS may now be found. Local agencies have been deployed in a wide variety of political, customary, social, and discursive ways in order to reframe international peacebuilding in more locally suited ways, as appears to be occurring from Kosovo to Timor Leste in a variety of ways.[xxxiv] This may be thought of as an unanticipated achievement of local agency, often through resistance to the limited HS capacities of international peacebuilders, and in such agency might also be found both a nascent social and an international contract. This process has aimed at ensuring human life in ways very similar to those envisaged in broader and more emancipatory versions of HS, albeit without the exclusive approaches to needs, rights and norms envisaged in the emancipatory liberal project (ie not necessarily in democratic, secular, meritocratic, gender equal,

non- discriminatory, law-abiding and market oriented terms). This potentially very uncomfortable third evolution of HS can be seen, at least in initial terms as both post- liberal and post-colonial.

HS remains a crucial concept. Its institutional version is clearly a basis for the emancipatory version, and this may provide a bridge into a third, post-colonial and post-liberal version. Yet, both the institutional and emancipatory versions have become part of a liberal institutional debate about social engineering (ie embedded liberal institutionalism). Even so they link to the question of local legitimacy and reflect more closely the indigenous facilities of local communities within changing polities than are committed to a perceived form of peace. It has been through this process that local agencies have offered a translated and post-liberal form of HS for international actors and scholars to engage with. If the crisis of the liberal peace is to be responded to and a sustainable peace developed in many of these post-conflict zones, this autonomous agency and translation needs to be mediated with the norms of the liberal peace, requiring a degree of international flexibility that has not so far been apparent.

A Post-Liberal, Post-Colonial HS

HS is not just a policy tool or an ambitious but superficial theory, as is often thought, but has become the site of a significant debate about how liberal peace building and international intervention more generally can achieve a sustainable form of peace with the sorts of capacities and characteristics that have been laid out in a range of documents- from the original UN Charter to the more recent High Level Panel Report. HS, and its associated concepts and frameworks, is developing at several levels. Non-state actors, and especially NGOs, are engaged in constructing an emancipatory version of the liberal peace at the grassroots level. IOs and states, on the other hand, have a role that impinges upon both the grassroots and the state levels, in security and institutional terms. Local- local actors increasingly are pushing HS into areas that recognises their everyday needs, culture, and identities. Rather than attempting to supplant or substitute for customary support mechanisms, social or labour movements, HS needs to reposition itself in recognition of this. Such tensions and differences have and are

still shaping debates HS" conceptualization. Given that HS signalled in both institutional and emancipatory form a deeper engagement with the lives of others in order to assist their development of liberal agencies (some would argue it means ever-deeper intervention and social engineering), even if this has over-stepped the mark into neo-colonialism in some cases, this has also engendered a productive confrontation between liberal politics and institutions and their non-liberal others and counterparts.

It is in this agonistic confrontation that HS has led towards the possibility of a fascinating exchange between its emancipatory goals and local patterns of politics, society, community, interests, in customary, religious, economic, and political terms. In this way it might be said that HS is partially responsible for producing a post-colonial version of peacebuilding and removing some of the blind-spots of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm. The consequences of this confrontation are only now becoming clear in the production of post-liberal hybridities in which reaction, resistance, co-option, tolerance, and acceptance interact to form a new post-liberal peace, meaning a pragmatic a recognition of what is and its hard choices on the ground, and a local-liberal hybridity. A post-liberal form of HS encounters and engages with such dynamics.

Conclusion

A few thoughts on how this post-liberal form of HS may be constituted follow. Firstly it would have to be contextually driven rather than centrally or institutionally dependent on a general blue print for peacebuilding. This means that it would offer the basis to develop an understanding of how individuals and communities situate themselves vis-a-vis their own understandings of security and attempt to assist in developing how they envisage their own security agencies. This means responding to how local and local-local voices define the problems they face in terms of the direct and most debilitating forms of violence they face as well as structural violence and materially related issues. Secondly, it also will represent to such contexts the range of international positions on security and on the liberal peace/ liberal statebuilding frameworks, including norms and practices related to democracy, human rights, the market,

development and needs. International agencies for the provision of narrow and emancipatory forms of HS must therefore create a modified process of engagement in the light of the broadest and deepest range of local voices they may engage with- from customary to transnational local actors- under the circumstances, avoiding a sole reliance on diplomatic, UN or World Bank contacts, for example. This means that new understandings of relationships, priorities, norms, and best practices must be invited in an attempt to building peacebuilding contract, not avoided.

HS may have to substitute for the lack of local narrow security capacity, but it must also be responsive to expressions of agency even in translation from acute contexts of acute alterity (say in Afghanistan, for example), and even- or especially- those that are expressive of resistance to the norms of the liberal peace. As a basis for a post-liberal form, HS becomes in these terms, not a concept which is fixed and predetermined, but a process of negotiation of between local and liberal, between internationals and context over what exactly constitutes HS. This will be uncomfortable but it is likely to have more durability in the shorter term than imagining that HS provides a platform to convert local actors to political liberalism, or liberal internationalism, or neoliberalism-framed modernisation strategies, and to emancipate them from themselves. Such focii have evaded the crucial issue of reconciliation after conflict through its faith in institutions and markets. A more contextual form of HS builds on existing institutional and security capacities and processes, including on the existing UN system, but sensitises it further in the context of local alterity, resistance and accommodation, and an international social contract as the basis for HS and peacebuilding. This is a basis for the 'return' of HS, if it ever went away in the first place.

References-

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Peace (Palgrave 2002): Mediating in Cyprus (Frank Cass, 1998). He has published many articles on aspects of peace and conflict theory. He can be contacted on opr@st- andrews.ac.uk. This chapter refers to, and extends, an earlier paper on the topic of HS: See Oliver P. Richmond, "Emancipatory Forms of Human Security and Liberal Peacebuilding", International Journal, Summer 2007.

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iii R. Ponzio, 'Why Human Security is a New Concept with Global Origins', St Antony's Review 1, No. 2, 2005, p.69.

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v See for example, Oliver P Richmond and Jason Franks, Liberal Peace Transitions, Op. Cit.

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Xi For more on this, See Oliver P. Richmond, The Transformation of Peace, London: Palgrave 2005, esp. Conclusion.

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International Terrorism

Although the term is not subject to a universally agreed definition, terrorism can be broadly understood as a method of coercion that utilizes or threatens to utilize violence in order to spread fear and thereby attain political or ideological goals. Contemporary terrorist violence is thus distinguished in law from "ordinary" violence by the classic terrorist "triangle": A attacks B, to convince or coerce C to change its position regarding some action or policy desired by A. The attack spreads fear as the violence is directed, unexpectedly, against innocent victims, which in turn puts pressure on third parties such as governments to change their policy or position. Contemporary terrorists utilize many forms of violence, and indiscriminately target civilians, military facilities and State officials among others. The challenges of countering terrorism are not new, and indeed have a long history.

The term "terrorism" was initially coined to describe the Reign of Terror, the period of the French Revolution from 5 September 1793 to 27 July 1794, during which the Revolutionary Government directed violence and harsh measures against citizens suspected of being enemies of the Revolution. In turn, popular resistance to Napoleon's invasion of the Spanish Peninsula led to a new form of fighter—the "guerrilla", which derives from the Spanish word guerra, meaning "little war" (Friedlander, 1976, p. 52). As a weapon of politics and warfare, however, the use of terrorism by groups can be traced back to ancient times, and as noted by Falk, "in various forms, terrorism is as old as government and armed struggle, and as pervasive" (Falk, 1990, pp. 39, 41). The focus of this module, and of the University Module Series as a whole, is on terrorist violence and the threats carried out by non-State groups and the response of the international community, especially States, regional organizations and the United Nations system

The purpose of this Module is to introduce students to the key concepts and principles that underpin international instruments and institutions concerned

with the complex topics of terrorism and how to counter terrorism, as well as any hard, security-based, responses adopted by States when confronted with acts of terrorism. When considering the concept of terrorism, it is important to note that as yet, there is no global consensus regarding an agreed definition of the term "terrorism" for legal purposes (see further Module 4). This Module will also provide a brief overview of modern terrorism and its implications for the international community. Regarding the prosecution of the perpetrators of acts of terrorism, it is vital to understand how, why and to what extent, the impact of a lack of a universally agreed global legal definition of the term may have had on the effective investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences. Principally, prosecuting chargeable crimes must rely on the judicial forums available. A decision to prosecute a "terrorist" offence will depend, among other factors, on legal and non-legal considerations. Furthermore, the State of custody must decide either to prosecute (as a "terrorist" or an ordinary crime) or to extradite elsewhere for prosecution persons accused of serious, transboundary terrorist crimes. Choosing between prosecuting on the grounds of "terrorist" or of ordinary crimes also involves wider issues such as the distinction between armed and non-armed conflict, the State use of counter-terrorist force and the return of "terrorists" who have been fighting abroad.

Notwithstanding the absence of a globally agreed, legal definition of terrorism, an effective and prevention-focused international response to terrorism is highly desirable, particularly one guided by a normative legal framework and embedded in the core principles of the rule of law, due process and respect for human rights. Many international and regional legal instruments already exist which are dedicated to countering and deterring terrorism (see further Modules 4 and 5), primarily through the investigation and prosecution of those suspected of committing related crimes by means of State criminal justice processes. While such international and regional instruments provide for effective prevention mechanisms, including interventions targeting specific types of criminal acts (e.g., hostage-taking, the hijacking of planes or ships, terrorist bombings and the funding of terrorism), States implement

their treaty obligations differently. As a result, criminal justice responses and outcomes in investigating and prosecuting terrorism-related crimes may vary between States.

Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, international support for more effective counter-terrorism measures and responses has led to greater international cooperation in counter-terrorist matters, and there is certainly evidence of a widespread hardening of approaches to the prosecution of "terrorists". This is important in a context that is witnessing the increased export and globalization of terrorism by groups such as Al-Qaida and the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (ISIL, or Da'esh), a trend that shows no sign of abating. In response, States are utilizing a range of counter-terrorism measures, from criminal justice to severe punishment.

Technological developments in the mid and late nineteenth century also played a pivotal role in the rise of terrorism. The ready availability of dynamite allowed terrorists to perpetrate and disseminate their deadly acts more widely as propaganda by the deed. The development of mass communication technologies allowed news, learning, ideas and events to be rapidly communicated across long distances, opening up an era of mass communication and of migration that was crucial to inspiring groups elsewhere. The invention of the telegraph and the steam-powered rotary press meant that newspapers could receive messages almost instantly after transmission from around the world and gave millions of people access to information about events virtually as soon as they occurred. New technologies, together with greater access to educational opportunities, facilitated the migration of agricultural labourers and artisans to urban centres. The development of commercial railways and trans-Atlantic passage steamers aided groups to travel long distances, and to carry their political sympathies further afield.

Of particular interest is the fact that such issues and debates have shaped the approach of the international community to its universal anti-terrorism conventions so that are framed around terrorist acts as serious international

crimes regardless of any underlying motivation. Broadly speaking, anti-terrorism instruments were adopted roughly in three phases (see further Module 4). Beginning with legislation covering the safety of aviation and shipping, the early instruments were developed from the 1960s through to the early 1990s, and addressed specific types of terrorist offences. Notably, acts perpetrated during "liberation conflicts" were expressly made exceptions to terrorist crimes, for example, the 1979 Hostages Convention (Treaty Series, vol. 1316, p. 205, adopted 17 December 1979, entered into force 3 June 1983), as such acts were to be dealt with under other areas of international law, such as international humanitarian law. The most recent phase reflects the broadening, post-categorization of terrorist groups and "causes", to include groups such as the Taliban, Al-Qaida and ISIL, and thus reflect the contemporary terrorist threat to the international community. Within this latter phase, anti-terrorism instruments have been developed that deal with new crimes associated with terrorist bombings (1997, Treaty Series, vol. 2149, p. 256), the financing of terrorism (1999, Treaty Series, vol. 2178, p. 197) and nuclear terrorism (2005, Treaty Series, vol. 2445, p. 89).

Countering terrorism through strategy-

1. Destroy terrorists and their organizations.
Once we have identified and located the terrorists, the United States and its friends and allies will use every tool available to disrupt, dismantle, and destroy their capacity to conduct acts of terror. The final element to the Defeat goal is an aggressive, offensive strategy to eliminate capabilities that allow terrorists to exist and operate— attacking their sanctuaries; leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances. While divulging the details of this aspect of the strategy would be imprudent, we will focus our efforts on three pillars. First, we will expand our law enforcement effort to capture, detain, and prosecute known and suspected terrorists. Second, America will focus decisive military power and specialized intelligence resources to defeat terrorist networks globally. Finally, with the cooperation of its partners and appropriate international organizations, we will continue our aggressive plan to eliminate the

sources of terrorist financing. To synchronize this effort, the Department of State will take the lead in developing specific regional strategies for the defeat of terrorism. We will further leverage regional relationships, by ensuring appropriate allied participation with the regional Combatant Commanders as they prosecute the war on terrorism.

2. End the state sponsorship of terrorism.

The United States will assume a clear and pragmatic approach in prosecuting the campaign against terrorism. This will include incentives for ending state sponsorship. When a state chooses not to respond to such incentives, tough decisions will be confronted. At all times within this new dynamic we will balance a nation's near-term actions against the long-term implications and consequences. The United States currently lists seven state sponsors of terrorism: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cuba, North Korea, and Sudan. We are firmly committed to removing countries from the list once they have taken the necessary steps under our law and policy.

A chickened past does not foreclose future membership in the coalition against terrorism. It is important for all countries to adopt a "zero tolerance" policy for terrorist activity within their borders. In the new global environment it is also important for states to understand how terrorists and their supporters mayuse legitimate means of communication, commerce, and transportation for illegal activities. Each state that gets out of the business of sponsoring terrorism represents a significant step forward and offers a tangible measure of success. America will never seek to remove states from the sponsorship list by lowering the bar; instead, these states should be encouraged—or compelled—to clear the bar.

3. Establish and maintain an international standard of accountability with regard to combating terrorism. In addition to U.S. pressure to end state sponsorship, we will strongly support new, strict standards for all states to meet in the global war against terrorism. States that have sovereign rights also have sovereign responsibilities. UNSCR 1373 clearly establishes states' obligations for

combating terrorism. This resolution calls upon all member states to cooperate to prevent terrorist attacks through a spectrum of activities, including suppressing and freezing terrorist financing, prohibiting their nationals from financially supporting terrorists, denying safe haven, and taking steps to prevent the movement of terrorists. Additionally, the 12 international counterterrorism conventions and protocols, together with UNSCR 1373, set forth a compelling body of international obligations relating to counterterrorism. We will continue to press all states to become parties to and fully implement these conventions and protocols. Together, UNSCR 1373, the international counterterrorism conventions and protocols, and the inherent right under international law of individual and collective self-defence confirm the legitimacy of the international community's campaign to eradicate terrorism. We will use UNSCR 1373 and the international counterterrorism conventions and protocols to galvanize international cooperation and to rally support for holding accountable those states that do not meet their international responsibilities.

4. Strengthen and sustain the international effort to fight terrorism. Defeating terrorism is our nation's primary and immediate priority. It is "our calling," as President Bush has said. But it is not our challenge alone. Unlike the Cold War, where two opposing camps led by superpower states vied for power, we are now engaged in a war between the civilized world and those that would destroy it. Success will not come by always acting alone, but through a powerful coalition of nations maintaining a strong, united international front against terrorism.

5. Interdict and disrupt material support for terrorists. A key component of any nation's sovereignty is control of its borders.
Every nation bears responsibility for the people and goods transiting its borders. While we expect states to fulfill their obligations, we will nevertheless be prepared to interdict terrorist ground, air, maritime, and cyber traffic by positioning forces and assets to deny terrorists access to new recruits, financing, equipment, arms, and information. As part of this undertaking, our National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction addresses the most serious of

these threats and outlines plans and policies to execute timely, effective interdiction   efforts   against

WMD- related materials, technologies, and expertise. Some irresponsible governments—or extremist factions within them—seeking to further their own agenda may provide terrorists access to WMD. Such actions would be unacceptable to the United States. We are prepared to act decisively to stop terrorists from acquiring WMD or precursors.

Conclusion-

Political violence may be endemic to the human condition, but we cannot tolerate terrorists who seek to combine the powers of modern technology and WMD to threaten the very notion of civilized society. The war against terrorism, therefore, is not some sort of "clash of civilizations"; instead, it is a clash between civilization and those who would destroy it.

Given these stakes, we must persevere until the United States, together with its friends and allies, eliminates terrorism as a threat to our way of life. As our enemies exploit the benefits of our global environment to operate around the world, our approach must be global as well. When they run, we will follow. When they hide, we will find them. Some battlefields will be known, others unknown. The campaign ahead will be long and arduous. In this different kind of war, we cannot expect an easy or definitive end to the conflict.

Climate Change

Climate change is the current rapid warming of the Earth's climate caused by human activity. If left unchecked (and current responses are doing little to halt it) it poses an unprecedented threat to human civilisation and the ecosystems on this planet.

What does it mean to say the climate is changing?

First, 'climate' is very different from 'weather'. Weather changes by the hour and, especially in the UK, naturally varies widely between years. We know the climate is changing because, averaged out over longer periods, the global mean temperature has been consistently rising, across land and sea. It is now about 0.8C above pre-industrial times.

The world has been experiencing changes in climates, affecting millions of lives. Already, there has been the bleaching of coral reefs, the sea ice volume in the Arctic has been reaching new lows, an increase in the number of natural disasters worldwide (such as wildifres, droughts, floods) and the mass migration of species. For more information, you can read more about the current effects of climate change.

What is the greenhouse effect?

Certain gases in the Earth's atmosphere (water vapour, CO_2, methane and others) allow sunlight to pass through, but then stop the heat from escaping back out into space - much like glass in a greenhouse. Without this, our planet would be uninhabitable to most forms of life. However, by changing the balance of gases in the atmosphere, humans have increased the greenhouse effect, causing the rising temperatures we now see.

Where do greenhouse gases come from?

As explained above, these gases exist naturally in our atmosphere. The most significant increases are in carbon dioxide (there is now over a third more CO_2 in

our atmosphere than there was before the industrial revolution) and methane. Methane is a more potent greenhouse gas, but it only remains in the atmosphere for about a decade. Carbon dioxide lasts for about 100 years or more, so even if we stopped emissions from human activities altogether, the planet would continue to warm up from the gases already emitted. The main causes of increased CO_2 in the atmosphere are burning fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas), and deforestation and other changes in land use that release stored CO_2 and methane.

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Is there any doubt about what's happening?

The idea of an urgent shift away from fossil fuels is not welcome to everyone, and those who seek to delay or prevent this have been very successful in

spreading the idea that climate scientists are uncertain about climate change (or even fraudulent!). Unfortunately there is, as legal terminology has it, no 'reasonable doubt' about climate change.

Could the rise in atmospheric carbon be coming from somewhere else?
Humans are currently emitting around 30 billion tonnes of CO_2 into the atmosphere every year. Of course, it could be coincidence that CO_2 levels are rising so sharply at the same time so let's look at more evidence that we're responsible for the rise in CO_2 levels:

- When we measure the type of carbon accumulating in the atmosphere, we observe more of the type of carbon that comes from fossil fuels

- This is corroborated by measurements of oxygen in the atmosphere. Oxygen levels are falling in line with the amount of carbon dioxide rising, just as you'd expect from fossil fuel burning which takes oxygen out of the air to create carbon dioxide

- Further independent evidence that humans are raising CO_2 levels comes from measurements of carbon found in coral records going back several centuries. These find a recent sharp rise in the type of carbon that comes from fossil fuels

  How do we know that the extra CO_2 in the atmosphere is warming the planet through the greenhouse effect?

- CO_2 absorbs heat at particular wavelengths. Satellites measure less heat escaping out to space, at the particular wavelengths that CO_2 absorbs heat, while surface measurements show more heat returning at CO_2 wavelengths.

- If an increased greenhouse effect is causing global warming, we should see certain patterns in the warming. For example, the planet should warm faster at night than during the day. This is indeed being observed.

- Another expected result of greenhouse warming is cooling in the upper atmosphere, otherwise known as the stratosphere. This is exactly what's happening.

- With the lower atmosphere (the troposphere) warming and the upper atmosphere (the stratosphere) cooling, another consequence is the boundary

between the two layers should rise as a consequence of greenhouse warming. This has also been observed.

- An even higher layer of the atmosphere, the ionosphere, is expected to cool and contract in response to greenhouse warming. This has been observed by satellites.

That depends on what we do now. Because of all the greenhouse gases already in the atmosphere, if the human race died out tomorrow, we'd still expect the planet to continue heating up. If we carry on emitting at the rate we are today, it will heat up much more rapidly. Rather than just warming, it makes more sense to think of it as the climate becoming more unstable, with extra energy in the system. Extreme weather events will become more common, ecosystems will be put under stress and so will human agriculture and water supplies. Some parts of the world are particularly vulnerable, such as sub-Saharan Africa, but no area will be immune.

The pledges that governments have made so far to cut emissions are insufficient. Even if implemented fully, they are consistent with an average global temperature rise of 4C. However, there are now concerns that global temperatures could rise at greater rate. A rise of 2C has been viewed as a 'safe limit' in international negotiations, but this does not fully take into account either the serious humanitarian and ecosystem impacts of this temperature rise in many parts of the world. The poorest countries of the world and small island states face threats, for the latter to their actual existence, with any global warming above 1.5°C. Nor does it consider the risk of triggering positive feedback mechanisms. An example of the latter is the release of frozen carbon and methane from melting in the polar regions, which would further accelerate warming. Since there is in reality no clear 'safe' zone, this demands an even more urgent response to cutting emissions.

What would a world 4C hotter look like?

- Increases of 6°C or more in average monthly summer temperatures would be expected in large regions of the world, including the Mediterranean, North Africa, the Middle East, and parts of the United States, with heatwaves raising temperatures further.

- Sea levels would rise by 0.5 to 1 metre at least by 2100, and by several metres more in the coming centuries. Major cities would be threatened by flooding.

- As oceans absorb excess CO2 they would become around 2 1/2 times as acid as they are now, and marine ecosystems would be devastated by this on top of the impacts of warming, overfishing and habitat destruction. Most coral reefs would be long destroyed (from around 1.4C temp rise)

- As ecosystems undergo rapid transition, mass extinctions are likely.

- Agriculture would be under extreme stress in much of the world, especially the poorest regions.

Politics of Climate change

As the climate crisis becomes more serious and more obvious, Americans remain resistant to decisive and comprehensive action on climate change. In "The Uninhabitable Earth: Life After Warming," David Wallace-Wells paints a frightening picture of the coming environmental apocalypse. Whole parts of the globe will become too hot for human habitation and those left behind will die of heat. Diseases will increase and mutate. Food shortages will become chronic as we fail to move agriculture from one climate to another. Whole countries like Bangladesh and parts of other countries like Miami will be underwater. Shortages of fresh water will affect humans and agriculture. The oceans will die, the air will get dirtier. "But," as Wallace-Wells argues, "what lies between us and extinction is horrifying enough."[1] That's because, as climate change takes its toll on Earth's physical planet, it will also cause social, economic, and political chaos as refugees flee areas that can no longer sustain them. If this prediction seems a bit extreme, all we have to do is look at recent weather events that keep breaking records to confront the possibility that the threat from climate change may indeed be existential.

PUBLIC OPINION ON THE CLIMATE CRISIS

Yet, in spite of the evidence at hand, climate change remains the toughest, most intractable political issue we, as a society, have ever faced. This is not to say that there hasn't been progress. In the United States, the amount of greenhouse gas

emissions has held steady since 1990–even though our economy and our population has grown.[2] But globally, greenhouse gases have increased since then, bringing humanity very close to the dangerous levels of global warming that were predicted.[3] As scientific evidence about the causes of climate change has mounted and as a consensus has evolved in the scientific community, the public has remained divided and large, important parts of the political class have been indifferent. For instance, although 2017 was a year of 16 different billion-dollar natural disasters,[4] according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the percentage of voters who were "very concerned" about climate change stayed within the 40% range–where it has been rather stubbornly stuck for the past two years.[5] The following chart shows Gallup public opinion polling for the past two decades.[6] During this period, but especially in the most recent decade, about a third to almost half of the public believes that the seriousness of global warming is generally exaggerated.

Within the past 25 years, climate change has evolved from an issue of interest primarily to some natural scientists into one of the top priorities on the global policy agenda. Research in political science and related fields offers systematic and empirically well-supported explanations for why solving the climate problem has turned out to be more difficult than originally anticipated. After reviewing this research, I focus on four areas in which we know less: (*a*) institutional design features that may help in mitigating or overcoming fundamental problems in the global cooperative effort; (*b*) factors that are driving variation in climate policies at national and subnational levels; (*c*) driving forces of climate policy beyond the state, in particular civil society, the science–policy interface, and public opinion; and (*d*) sociopolitical consequences of failing to avoid major climatic changes. The article concludes by identifying key questions at the micro, meso, and macro levels that should be addressed by political scientists in the coming years. In view of the fact that governance efforts at the global level are progressing very slowly, greater attention to bottom-up dynamics appears useful, both for analytical reasons (there is lots of variation to be explained) and for normative reasons.

Political efforts to deal with the global climate change problem by means of negotiating and implementing a global treaty are progressing at a pace that is far slower than what the large majority of climate scientists deem necessary for avoiding major climatic changes. I start with a review of research that accounts for difficulties in achieving global climate cooperation. Whereas the reasons for these difficulties are now quite well understood, we know much less about three issues that are also crucial not only from a scientific but also from a practical viewpoint. The first concerns institutional design features that may help in mitigating or overcoming fundamental problems in the global cooperative effort. The second concerns factors that are driving variation in climate policies at national and subnational levels. The third concerns driving forces of climate policy beyond the state, in particular civil society, the science–policy interface, and public opinion. After reviewing the literature on these three issues, the article moves on to a final issue: unless large-scale GHG reduction efforts get under way very soon, major climatic changes are virtually unavoidable. Political scientists have thus explored possible sociopolitical consequences of climate change as well.

There is strong scientific consensus that the negative consequences of climate change in terms of economic and ecological damages are very serious. Policy makers clearly pay attention to this evidence, but problem solving has turned out to be much harder than many practitioners and scientists initially expected. In the 1980s, a global environmental problem with somewhat similar geophysical properties had appeared on the policy agenda: the depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer (**Parson 2003**, **Mitchell 2006a**, **Victor 2011**). Emissions of ozone-depleting chemicals worldwide had, similar to the climate problem, changed the composition of the atmosphere. In the ozone case, the thinning of the stratospheric ozone layer leads to increased UV radiation, which in turn is detrimental to agricultural production and human health. Within 10 years, an effective global regime was established, and the ozone layer is likely to be back at its preindustrial level within the next few decades. The global ozone regime is based on a framework convention established in 1985, a protocol established in 1987, and a series of amendments to this protocol.

The widespread enthusiasm about this outstanding success in global environmental policy making motivated the international community to use almost the same approach for climate change. The United Nations' 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) sets the general goal, namely "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened, and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner." The 1997 Kyoto Protocol (KP) to the UNFCCC defines specific GHG emission limits for 37 industrialized countries and transition economies, and the European Union.

The early enthusiasm has, in the meantime, given way to widespread pessimism (**Victor 2001**, **Barrett 2005**, **Michaelowa & Michaelowa 2012**). Shortly after the KP was concluded, it became evident that the United States, the largest GHG emitter at that time (now it is China), would not join the agreement. Canada, which ratified the KP in 2002, formally withdrew from it in 2012. Moreover, in contrast to the ozone regime, obtaining specific reduction commitments from emerging economies and developing countries has turned out to be far more difficult than expected. Why is global cooperation to solve the climate problem so difficult? Existing research offers systematic and empirically well supported answers that also point to institutional designs that could help in problem solving.

Climate change mitigation is a global collective good (sometimes also called a global common pool resource) whose "production" requires global collective action. Individuals, firms, and other actors externalize parts of their production and consumption costs by "exporting" emissions into the atmosphere, where they spread around the globe. The resulting increase in GHG concentrations in the atmosphere then harms everyone, albeit to different degrees. Trying to avoid dangerous levels of climatic change involves opportunity costs for GHG emitters and is associated with a free-rider problem. Reducing emissions or avoiding

more emissions is costly and, when implemented, generates a positive global externality. The prisoner's dilemma characteristic of the problem, which in the climate case also corresponds to the tragedy-of-the-commons logic, is an impediment to global problem solving, that is, global collective action (**Sandler 2004**, **Thompson 2006**).

The organization of the international system into ~200 sovereign states means that the global collective action problem is structured in terms of a political problem between and within states. Between states, the global collective action problem is exacerbated by strong asymmetry in benefits and costs of problem solving, mainly across richer and poorer countries. GHG emissions are primarily a function of economic output, although the goal is of course to decouple emission trajectories from economic growth. This means that almost automatically, for the time being, large economies are large GHG emitters. And, with the exceptions of China, India, Brazil, and some other emerging economies, these large economies are also the richest and technologically most advanced countries. This asymmetry has adverse effects on the potential for global cooperation (**Ward et al. 2001**). Large, rich countries with large GHG emissions would have to contribute most to problem solving. Hence they experience the highest opportunity costs, but they are likely to suffer least from climatic changes because they have a high capacity for adaptation. In view of the global free-rider problem (see above), they have an incentive to invest in adaptation measures, rather than in mitigation, because the investing country can directly appropriate the benefits of adaptation. Developing countries, in contrast, are much more likely to suffer from climatic changes because of their smaller capacity for adaptation. Yet, even if they reduced their economic growth to zero, they could not (with the exception of China, India, and Brazil) contribute in a significant way to solving the problem. And those large emerging economies whose commitment to major GHG reductions is essential have a different social rate of time preference (discount rate) than mature industrialized economies: they prefer to grow first and "clean up" later (**Spilker 2012a**,**b**).

Within countries, some additional characteristics of the climate issue compound the global collective action problem by making states reluctant to invest in climate change mitigation, irrespective of the global free-rider challenge. The key problem here concerns discounting. Reducing GHG emissions to levels deemed necessary by most climate scientists (approximately 50–80% below 1990 levels by 2050–2100) requires a fundamental conversion of the entire global energy supply system (**Victor 2011**). It requires large-scale investments in the short to medium term (most notably, a major shift from fossil fuel to renewable energy sources), whereas the main benefits accrue in the long term (avoiding major climatic changes). However, people tend to discount climate change–related damages that occur in the long term, and by implication also the benefits of climate change mitigation (**Jacobs & Matthews 2012**; we return to public opinion below). Given that investments in climate change mitigation in the short term loom large, this results in a low net present value of climate change mitigation. In view of rather weak public pressure for climate change mitigation, policy makers are unlikely to assign a high priority to this issue, relative to other issues on domestic and international political agendas.

Another obstacle to climate change mitigation is political uncertainty (**Hovi et al. 2009**, **Victor 2011**, **Urpelainen 2012a**). Political uncertainty, in the climate policy context, means that any given government's incentives and preferences can change over time and that uncertainty about such changes can hamper efforts to establish an effective long-term policy in the first place. Suppose a government wants to introduce incentives to motivate firms and private households to reduce their GHG emissions (e.g., through tax breaks, subsidies, or feed-in tariffs for photovoltaic energy). If firms and households believe, however, that the government could abandon these costly measures once the next economic downturn or change of government arrives, they are less likely to invest in climate change mitigation in the first place. This could undermine efforts to install the policy. This problem materializes within and between countries. It would exist even if one single world government could decide autocratically whether or not to reduce GHG emissions worldwide. Not only the sheer magnitude of the task of having to reduce global emissions by up to 80%

within the next 50–70 years would make it extremely hard for a hypothetical world government to firmly and credibly commit to such a course of action. Long-term credible commitment is also made difficult by the fact that the government would change many times over the decades, and political priorities would almost certainly change as well. In other words, any given government and its citizens will wonder whether investing billions into climate change mitigation today is worthwhile if a future government might "drop the ball,"causing global warming to happen anyway. This argument presumes, of course, that changing government incentives strongly affects continuing costs, and not just fixed up-front costs when first installing a policy. It also presumes that contemporary investments in climate change mitigation can be undone (in terms of not avoiding global warming) if government turns away from GHG mitigation policy in the future. The political uncertainty problem described here is somewhat similar to the time-inconsistency problem in economic theory.

Yet another obstacle to effective climate change mitigation concerns cost–benefit distributions within countries. As noted by **Oye & Maxwell (1994)**, who draw on theories of collective action and economic regulation, environmental problems are easier to solve when problem solving generates large benefits for a small group of actors (large benefits per actor) and the costs of problem solving can be dispersed over a very large group (small costs per actor). This argument helps explain why the ozone problem was solved rather quickly and effectively, and why the climate problem has turned out to be much harder to deal with. In the ozone case, the benefits of solving the problem were very substantial and easy to communicate to the public (e.g., less skin cancer and less damage to agriculture; see **Sprinz & Vaahtoranta 1994**); the overall costs of solving the problem were orders of magnitude smaller (a few billion US dollars, compared to hundreds of billions of dollars or more in the climate case). In the ozone case, the problem was solved through a shift to alternative chemicals. This substitution brought some additional economic benefit to a few large firms accounting for a large share of global production of the relevant chemicals. The substitution costs, which per capita were very low, were imposed on consumers. Consequently, the industry concerned eventually welcomed the proposed solution, and the

additional per capita costs to consumers were too small to provoke enough opposition to stop the policy (**Oye & Maxwell 1994**; see also **Victor 2011** and **Barrett 2005**). In the climate case, some industries may benefit from GHG reductions (e.g., producers of climate-friendly technologies), but the substitution costs for the average firm and consumer in most economies are likely to be rather high. This means that neither industry nor consumers (many of whom are also voters) are likely to support strong climate policies. In other words, the net present value per capita of solving the ozone problem was evidently much higher than the equivalent value of solving the climate problem.

Conventional wisdom holds that solving this problem requires a powerful centralized enforcement system. Yet, as **Hovi et al. (2009**, p. 31) observe, "The dismal conclusion is that potent enforcement systems are unlikely to be politically feasible precisely when they are most needed. Conversely, whenever a potent enforcement system is politically feasible, there is likely little need for it." One might object, however, that slow progress in global climate policy making may not primarily be due to an enforcement problem in view of strong free-riding incentives. If insufficient possibilities for enforcement were the key problem, countries could safely engage in more ambitious commitments without having to fear punishment for defection and free riding later on. The fact that many governments (e.g., those of China, India, and the United States) are unwilling to contract any international obligations to cut GHG emissions suggests that noncompliance is regarded as costly (on the issue of noninstitutionalized enforcement, see **Victor 2011**). The political backlash against Canada's exit from the KP lends some support to this assumption. However, it remains unclear how important the free-riding and enforcement obstacle is, relative to other obstacles such as discounting and political uncertainty. Further research could use content analysis of government justifications for cooperation or noncooperation as well as experiments on collective goods provision.

The preceding sections have shown that stabilizing GHG emissions at a level that avoids major changes in the Earth's climate system will be extremely challenging. What could happen if political efforts fail? Social scientists have

shown that climatic changes can have very serious implications for national economies and people's livelihoods. The most negative consequences are to be expected in poor countries, primarily those in arid or semiarid zones and those with large, low-level, high-population coastal areas (**IPCC 2007**, **Stern 2007**). The Stern Report, a large effort to estimate the costs and benefits of climate change mitigation, concludes that severe climate change (3–6° temperature increase) could cause annual economic losses on the order of 5–20% of GDP (**Stern 2007**). Other economic assessments have arrived at smaller numbers (**Tol & Yohe 2009**).

Many policy makers and some scientists have jumped to the conclusion that severe climatic changes, because they can have massive implications for economic systems and people's livelihoods, increase the risk of political violence, in the extreme case war. For instance, former UN Secretary General **Kofi Annan (2006)** argued, "climate change also is a threat to peace and security." The **IPCC**, which summarizes and assesses at regular intervals the scientific knowledge on the causes and consequences of climate change as well as mitigation and adaptation options and involves thousands of scientists worldwide, has echoed such claims (**IPCC 2007**).

Concerns about the potential political fallout of unmitigated climate change have provoked an innovative research effort that has brought together conflict researchers and environmental policy specialists. Already in the 1980s and 1990s, following the "limits to growth" debate (**Meadows et al. 2004**), some scholars revived an argument made by Thomas Malthus back in 1798. They claimed that environmental degradation contributed to political violence (**Homer-Dixon 1991**, **1999**; **Spillmann & Baechler 1995**). This research identified, at the conceptual level, a variety of causal pathways through which environmental degradation may generate violent conflict (**Hauge & Ellingsen 1998**). A considerable number of qualitative case studies offered support for these arguments (**Homer-Dixon 1999**).

Although this literature showed that environmental degradation can contribute to conflict, in the extreme case even violent conflict, it has several limitations (**Gleditsch 1998**, **Bernauer et al. 2012b**). For instance, the cases that were studied were not randomly chosen and tended to focus on small-scale conflicts. These features make it hard to draw robust conclusions about when and why environmental degradation leads to violent conflict of particular types, and when and why it does not. Large-N quantitative studies on the subject, which have been undertaken in the past few years, have addressed some of these limitations. A growing number of studies have focused on whether climatic changes (rather than environmental degradation more broadly) increase the risk of violent conflict (**Homer-Dixon 1991**, **Hendrix & Glaser 2007**, **Buhaug 2010b**, **Raleigh 2010**, **Theisen et al. 2011**, **Gartzke 2012**, **Hendrix & Salehyan 2012**, **Koubi et al. 2012**). They have addressed the climate-conflict claim mainly along three lines.

First, they have examined whether there is a direct relationship between climatic changes (or climate variability) and large-scale political violence measured in terms of civil or interstate war (**Zhang et al. 2007**, **Buhaug 2010a**, **Hsiang et al. 2011**, **Gartzke 2012**).

Second, they have studied potential indirect effects in an effort to bring empirical testing more closely in line with theoretical arguments. These arguments hold, for instance, that climate change may influence the risk of violence through its effects on economic activity. For instance, recent studies have examined whether climate change increases the risk of political violence via its presumably negative impact on economic performance (**Koubi et al. 2012**). On both accounts, and despite some initial claims to the contrary (**Miguel et al. 2004**), the results have been overwhelmingly negative; that is, there is no robust evidence that climatic changes are systematically associated with large-scale violent conflict (a milestone in this research is the special issue of the *Journal of Peace Research* 49/1, **2012**). This "nonresult" is important, for it challenges a very prominent political claim that has frequently been voiced and has implicitly served to legitimize stronger climate policies (I return to this point below).

Third, whereas the older environment-conflict literature was rather ambiguous in its definitions of conflict, quantitative work has forced researchers to be more explicit about the outcome to be explained. This applies both to scale and intensity. The first and second lines of research, noted above, find that the risk of climatic changes leading to large-scale political violence involving the state (civil war, interstate war) is insignificant. This general finding also holds when spatially disaggregated data on civil war are used (**Theisen et al. 2011**). It does not, however, tell us whether climatic changes have resulted in conflict on a smaller and/or less intense scale.

Interestingly, recent studies using new event datasets arrive at contradictory findings for lower-intensity conflict. For instance, **Hendrix & Salehyan (2012)** find that in Africa, rainfall variability correlates with political conflict. Yet, in contrast to the scarcity argument, violent events are more likely in wetter years, though extreme deviations in rainfall in both directions (drier, wetter) generate more violent and nonviolent political conflict. A recent study on water-related conflicts (the most likely manifestation of climate change–related conflicts) shows, however, that violent water-related conflicts, even at very local scales, are extremely rare, and that water cooperation is much more frequent. It also shows that water conflicts result primarily from expanding water demand rather than climate-related reductions in water supply (**Bernauer et al. 2012a**, **Böhmelt et al. 2012**). This research, which is informed by a wealth of case studies on local resources management (**Ostrom 2009**), suggests that institutionalized mechanisms for adaptation and conflict resolution are the most likely reason why violent water-related conflicts are rare.

The research discussed here provides clarification in respect to potential motivations for climate change mitigation policies. It cannot show, of course, what would happen under extreme climate change scenarios. It suggests, however, that other types of negative implications of climate change that cause other forms of human suffering should constitute the dominant justifications for GHG mitigation policies. This means that justifications based on human security and economic damages (**Barnett & Adger 2007**, **Raleigh 2011**) should provide

the basis for policy making. The concept of human security became politically prominent with the United Nations Development Programme's 1994 Human Development Report. It emphasizes the well-being of the individual, rather than the state, and relates to a wide range of components of human welfare, ranging from employment, food security, and health to human rights (**Adger 2010**). Although political science research appears to be moving toward closure of the climate-war debate, major research opportunities remain with respect to the effects of climatic changes on low-intensity political violence and instability (e.g., **Benjaminsen et al. 2012**), migration, and adaptation strategies, as well as other facets of human security.

The political science literature on climate change issues is very diverse, both in its substantive questions and its methodology. Its topics range from global regime formation to public opinion to the sociopolitical implications of climate change. It relies on the entire spectrum of modern social science methods, ranging from verbal and formal theory to case studies, statistical work, and experimental approaches.

This diversity implies that, in contrast to some other research areas in political science (e.g., electoral behavior, democratization, war), political science research on climate change does not concentrate on a narrowly defined set of outcome variables. Rather, climate change is viewed as a large-scale problem whose political dimensions political scientists—in addition to scholars from many other scientific disciplines—are trying to understand with whatever analytical tools they can muster. This problem-oriented nature of political science research on climate change makes many of its results policy relevant. But it has not yet enabled the emergence of a cohesive research community. As a result, much of the most innovative political science work on climate politics has, thus far, appeared in non–political science journals. Although policy makers may not care much about this, the discipline of political science should.

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